University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Departmental Papers (ASC)

Annenberg School for Communication

1-1-1997

20 Years of Television in Israel: Are There Long-Run Effects on
Values, Social Connectedness, and Cultural Practices?
Elihu Katz
University of Pennsylvania, ekatz@asc.upenn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers
Part of the Communication Commons

Recommended Citation
Katz, E. (1997). 20 Years of Television in Israel: Are There Long-Run Effects on Values, Social
Connectedness, and Cultural Practices?. Journal of Communication, 47 (2), 3-20. https://doi.org/10.1111/
j.1460-2466.1997.tb02703.x

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/289
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

20 Years of Television in Israel: Are There Long-Run Effects on Values, Social
Connectedness, and Cultural Practices?
Abstract
Television broadcasting was introduced in Israel late, after years of debate over its likely effects.
Opponents of the medium, led by David Ben-Gurion, thought that renascent Hebrew culture would be
undermined by the introduction of foreign values, that the People of the Book would turn into the people
of television, that ascetic and pioneering values would be uprooted by consumerism, that ideological
politics would be displaced by personality politics. Those in favor of the introduction of television argued
that the medium carried no intrinsic message, that it would do whatever it was told inform, educate, teach
Hebrew, absorb immigrants, foster creativity, enfranchise marginal groups, show Israel's achievements to
itself and to the world.

Disciplines
Communication

This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/289

Twenty Years of Television in Israel: Are
There Long-Run Effects on Values and
Cultural Practices?

Elihu Katz and Hadassah Haas

Television broadcasting was introduced in Israel late, after
years of debate over its likely effects. Opponents of the medium, led
by David Ben-Gurion, thought that renascent Hebrew culture would
be undermined by the introduction of foreign values, that the People
of the Book would turn into the people of television, that ascetic and
pioneering values would be uprooted by consumerism, that
ideological politics would be displaced by personality politics. Those
in favor of the introduction of television argued that the medium
carried no intrinsic message, that it would do whatever it was told
inform, educate, teach Hebrew, absorb immigrants, foster creativity,
enfranchise marginal groups, show Israel's achievements to itself and
to the world.
The absence of television seemed more acute on the eve of the
Six Day War of 1967 inasmuch as TV broadcasts were being received
from the surrounding Arab states. Indeed, television was introduced in
Israel shortly after this war-not only to right the ostensible propaganda
disadvantage, but because it was thought, wishfully, that the new

medium would make for effective communication between Israelis
and people in the newly occupied territories. Some of those who
opposed television thought that this was simply a bandy
rationalization, but in the post-war euphoria, not many opponents
were left.
In 1970-but without any specific reference to the fact that
television broadcasting had just begun-the Ministry of Education and
Culture commissioned a major study of the uses of leisure, culture
and communication in Israel (Katz and Gurevitch, 1974). Twenty
years later, in 1990, a repeat study was commissioned by the Ministry
and the US-Israel Bi-National Science Foundation. Based on
face-to-face interviews with national samples of 3000 Israelis (the
1990 study includes the Arab sector as well), the two studies are
comparable in almost every respect. By good fortune, therefore, we
are in a position to assess the long-run effects of introducing
television on a whole society. This is much easier said than done,
however, because so many other things have happened during the 20
years between the studies. It is only at great risk, therefore, that one
can attribute causality to television in accounting for the changes in
Israeli culture and society during this period. It is especially ironic,
because not a few of the changes that emerge from comparing the two
studies coincide with the predictions of its effect-more often with

those of its opponents than with its proponents.
Thus, the trouble with trying to analyze the effects of 20 years
of television is that this same 20-year period also includes two wars, a
doubling of the population, and an increase in the level of general
education such that the society, on average, is three years more
educated than in 1970. Moreover, 1977 saw the first overturn of
Israeli politics from left to right and the coming to political maturity
of the second generation of immigrants from Asian and African
countries. The new parity between citizens of Eastern and Western
background challenged not only the long-standing political consensus,
but also the (predominantly Western) cultural order. During the
20-year period, an additional hour of leisure was added to the day, a
second day off from work was given (Friday) and a rise in the
standard of living achieved. To study the long-run effects of television,
therefore, one has to know how to sort out the effects of television
from those of war, affluence, education, political change, cultural
pluralism and so on!
Having sounded the warning, let us proceed nevertheless to
examine changing trends in the values and cultural practices of Jewish
Israelis over these twenty years, and to speculate about the extent to
which they may be attributable to television.1 To accomplish this, the
paper will proceed as follows: (1) it will present an overview of the

ways in which television broadcasting was institutionalized in Israel;
(2) it will consider the patterns of television viewing; (3) it will report
on major changes in the patterns of consuming culture and the arts,
including reading; (4) it will review the study's findings concerning
value changes in Israeli society during this period; (5) it will report on
the changes in the functions and gratifications provided by the media,
old and new, with respect to these values. Having done so, we shall
return to weigh the possible long-run effects of television.

Television: The Israeli Version

From its inception, broadcasting in Israel was a monopoly
service provided at first by the Government, and, from 1965, by a
BBC-like authority financed by a license fee and directed by a Board
of Governors representing the political spectrum but independent of
Government. When television was established in 1968, joining radio
as one of the services of the monopolistic Israel Broadcasting
Authority (IB), Israel Television operated only one channel-which it
yielded during the daytime hours to the Educational Broadcasting
service of the Ministry of Education. Cable television by subscription
was introduced in the early 90s, and a second over-the-air channel
(like the British ITV) was introduced in 1993, financed by advertising

but overseen by a public Board, different from that of the IBA.
Before the very recent introduction of multiple channels, Israel
TV had excelled in coverage of news and public affairs, although this
achievement was sometimes impeded by the overly politicized
appointments of the Governing Board and of the Director General. As
good as it was at public affairs, it was poor, at best, in original drama
and light entertainment. Jokers used to say that Israel television could
well do without drama and entertainment, since there is plenty of that
in the news.
In its best days, the main 9 pm news attracted 70% of the
population on an average evening. Critics and advocates of multiple
channels objected that a society cannot claim to be democratic if it
has only one television channel and one major news bulletin. Yet, the
evidence shows that this highly politicized society collected itself for
the nightly news magazine and willingly accepted its agenda for
political discussion. There was no evidence of brainwashing: hawks
and doves, Jews and Arabs viewed the monopolistic news magazine,
believed it on the whole, and used it to talk politics not only in
like-thinking groups but across political divisions.2 Indeed, the 9 pm
news magazine became a sort of civic ritual during which the society
communed with itself. There was an informal norm that attendance
was "required," and that there were to be no intrusions during the

news-no telephone calls, for example. American politicians now are
talking wishfully about how to organize "electronic town meetings"
-having blithely exchanged their three channels for hundreds. Rather
than undemocratic, the lesson of 15 years of Israel TV is that
participatory democracy may be enhanced, rather than impeded, by
gathering its citizens in a single public space set aside for receiving
and discussing reliable reports on the issues of the day.
The introduction of multiple channels has changed the picture.
The heavy emphasis on news and public affairs has given way to
much lighter entertainment on the new channels. Even the many
cheap-to produce political talk shows are sprinkled with very high
doses of sensation, scandal, personalities, provocations, and pop. And
advertising interrupts everything. Ironically, the introduction of a
competing news magazine (at the same hour as the original) has
lowered the total number of viewers of both programs-as if the very
offer of choice abolished the norm of collective viewing of the
television news.
Like in other countries-not only the smaller ones-a high
percentage of television programming is imported from abroad,
especially from the United States. The new second channel promised
to commission many more programs from local producers, but with
double the hours of broadcasting, the overall ratio of domestic to

imported programming has declined, if anything, to well below 50%.
If one also takes account of the dozen or more cable channels-now
reaching some 60% of the population-the proportion of homemade
programming is tiny.
The idea that fewer hours of broadcasting might result in
better programs does not occur to anybody. Since its inception in
1968, Israel TV has gone from three nights per week of experimental
broadcasting, to six nights per week, and, after a religious/political/
cultural battle over Sabbath-eve broadcasting, to seven nights. The
next frontier was breakfast television. And with the inauguration of
cable channels and the second over-the-air channel, television in
Israel has become the non-stop public utility so familiar in the rest of
the world.
The Viewers

Apart from a few religious and secular ascetics, every home
(94%) has a television set, and the modal viewing time is 2-3 hours.
More telling, perhaps, is that one third of the leisure time of adult
Israelis is spent viewing television. There are five hours unspoken for
on working days, of which an average of 1.7 hours go to viewing TV,
and of the combined 14.1 hours of leisure on the two days of the
weekend, 4.3 hours go to TV.3 Compared to 1970, the added hours of

leisure come from a shorter workday and a longer weekend, in
addition to the reduced time spent on housework, averaging over an
hour a day. In a large sense, television may be said to be consuming
all of the extra leisure time made available since 1970 without major
harm to other activities. Surprisingly, it has not even reduced time
spent outside the home. Nevertheless, in close-up, one should note the
decline in time spent sleeping, eating, reading newspapers and books,
and listening to the radio. Time spent on each of these activities has
been reduced since 1970, although only by minutes, not hours, per
day.
Men watch more hours of TV than women. Older people and
the less educated are heavier viewers.
When the first channel was just being launched in 1970,
Israelis ranked their preferences among television offerings as
information first, entertainment second, and culture third. Fifty five
per cent put information in first place. In 1990, information and
entertainment were ranked first by a smaller proportion of viewers
(43%), tied for first place with entertainment (43%). That does not
mean that they wish the quality of programming to be lower: other
data suggest, rather, that they are asking for more variety. They also
want more "familiar" programs those that are home-produced--even
while criticizing the news for being too domestic and not worldly

enough.
It is very difficult to answer the question whether television
has increased or decreased attention to civic affairs. Israel is
considered to be a country of avid news consumers, and during the
years of monopolistic national broadcasting the most highly rated
program on television by far was the evening news. Radio news
bulletins and magazines were, and still are, highly attended. Yet,
comparing 1990 with 1970, we note some decline in viewer
preference for news over other genres, and a substantial decline in the
total audience for TV news (especially since the introduction of
competing channels). The level of newspaper reading remains very
high (some 90% read a daily newspaper), but the habit of reading two
newspapers has given way to reading only one especially since the
major evening tabloids are distributed, in effect, at the same hour as
the morning papers. Also the number of newspapers has declined.
Is television responsible for any of this? Perhaps so. It may be
argued that in its first years, television presented itself as the national
showcase for news, reduced attention somewhat to the other news
media, and gradually redirected audience attention elsewhere, to what
Postman (1986) would call

amusement. But, like others of the

ostensible long-run effects of television, this is no more than an
interpretation, a surmise; it may well be that the sources of change

originate elsewhere and that changes in television viewing habits is
more an effect than a cause.

Cultural Practices, 1970-1990

Has television affected other forms of consuming culture?
What about the arts?
It is important to recall at this point that the amount of time
spent outside the home-except for the aged-remains virtually
unchanged between 1970 and 1990, and therefore unaffected by
television. Enough extra leisure is available for people to include 2-3
hours per day of TV viewing in their time budgets4 without sacrificing
some 2112 hours "outside"- visiting, meandering, going to meetings,
and consuming culture.
What has changed during these 20 years is what people do
when they go out. Compared to 1970, there has been a major decline
in the consumption of the arts. There is a per capita drop in the scope
and/or frequency of attendance at cinema, theatre, concerts, museums,
and lectures. This is very surprising since we had reason to expect an
increase in participation in the arts inasmuch as the society is three
years more educated since 1970, and education is positively
correlated with consumption of the arts.

Ironically, the box-offices are unaware that there has been a
decline in per capita consumption of the arts. The reason they don't
notice is because the population has doubled, so that in 1990 the
theater and concert halls are as full as they were in 1970! Only we, the
researchers, know that a sea-change is in progress! Employing a
variety of measures it can be shown that the scope of the audience, or
frequency of attendance, or both, have lowered the extent of
involvement in the institutions of "high" culture. Nobody is surprised
that cinema attendance is down- casually putting the blame on
television-but the same drop applies to theater, concerts, museums,
etc.
Before making the wrong interpretation, however, it should be
added that attendance at sporting events is also down. In 1990, per
capita attendance at such events is lower than it was in 1970-both in
scope and in frequency.
By contrast, there has been a rise, between 1970 and 1990, in
the rate of going to pubs, eating out in restaurants, domestic and
foreign travel, and participatory sports.
Our reading of these findings suggests that there is a decline in
what may be called spectacle and a rise in those activities that are
active, interactive, intimate, where participants bring their own
programs along. In other words, there is a decline in those things

which require one to sit in a particular place at a particular time, to
watch a curtain go up and listen to some professional performer
deliver a message from the stage. Correspondingly, leisure pursuits
that have to do with activity, interactivity, flexible time, one's own
small group and one's own agenda are on the rise.
Let us consider whether television may be to "blame."
Television might explain these changes in the sense that it has given
us an overdose of spectacle. People are fed up with staring; there's
enough spectacle in the living-room, and when one goes outside the
home one looks for something different. When people do go out they
want to do more than stare. They want to be active, interactive,
intimate, creative, and so on.
Any explanation, of course, would have to account for the
decline in reading as well. Clearly, reading is not a spectacle. Nor
does television displace the functions of reading, as we shall see. But
reading does involve a lot of looking, and so perhaps the explanation
does apply-at least until we find a better one.
Another possibility is that television satiates the appetite for
the arts and the other media. We would all intuitively agree that
cinema attendance has been hurt by television. The fact is, however,
that people are seeing more, not fewer, films than they did in 1970,
but they are seeing them on TV. This may be equally true for theater,

concerts, sports, even museums, as well as reading fiction and reading
news. The arts, especially cinema, are the content of television.
According to McLuhan's (1964) rule, each new medium incorporates
its predecessor as content. Perhaps television gratifies these needs for
experience of the arts.
One must also take account of the alleged decline of the
performing arts in other countries, too.5 Of course, television may be
the cause here as well, but a competing explanation would suggest
that the culture of pluralism and postmodernism has challenged the
Western canon and shaken up the entrenched hierarchy of "high" and
"popular" art. It may be that people--even the upwardly mobile--don't
"have to" prefer Beethoven to rock any more. We have already noted
the coming of age of the second generation of Israelis whose parents
originate from Africa and Asia, and the highest drop in arts
participation is among the Israeli-born of 20-30 years, not only among
those of Eastern origin but among those of Western parentage as well.
The fact that the decline is no less strong among the Western groups
born to television rekindles the possibility that television may be a
cause.
What we are suggesting is that television may have preempted
the other performing arts by doing what they do, as well as fostering
an awareness that the rest of society is doing the same thing at the

same time. In this sense, television offered the "togetherness" of a
spectacle, superceding the spectacle of going to the theater, a concert,
or to a political rally to share an experience with others who are
present. Is it possible, we are asking, that the collective experience of
viewing television-- of viewing one-channel, public television-has
satiated not only the desire for spectacle but the further need for
widely shared experience and deliberation? Rather than contributing
to the atomization of society and undermining its culture, as the
opponents feared, Israel Television may have moved the collectivity
from outside to inside, but served the collectivity very well,
nevertheless. Stated otherwise, we are speculating on the possibility
that 20 years of monopolistic public television offered Israelis a
strong new taste of collectivity in the double sense of simultaneous
communion with very large numbers of one's compatriots, and shared
content of collective import. Cardiff and Scannell (1987) make much
the same case for the early days of both BBC radio and BBC
television. Dialectically, we further propose that this "togetherness"
and its implicit obligations became tiresome and oppressive after a
while (as did other aspects of collective culture) and pushed people to
find groups of intimates with whom to do "other" kinds of things.

Value Changes, 1970—1990

Another area in which we have observed change between
1970 and 1990 is the area of values, and these changes also
reverberate with some of the concerns of the opponents of television.
But almost nobody would venture that television is powerful enough,
in itself, to have induced change in such deep-seated values. It is more
reasonable that the impetus for change comes from elsewhere, and
that the institutionalization of television and the viewing habits that it
cultivates are only part of a larger picture. Let us now examine these
changes, paying particular attention to values such as individualism
versus collectivism and hedonism versus asceticism, that have entered
our discussion so far.
At the outset, it should be emphasized that the society is very
traditional on the whole. Compared to other western-oriented societies,
family, nation and collectivity are very important, as is connection
with the religious tradition. National and traditional holidays involve
almost everyone, whether in religious or secular guise. Escapism is
very low. But changes are taking place, slowly but surely.
We asked a series of value questions in this national survey
about the "importance" Israelis attribute (1) to self, (2) to family, (3)
to friends, (4) to state and (5) to peoplehood. Questions touched on

affective and cognitive aspects in each of these realms. We asked, for
example: How important is it for you to know yourself, to want to
study, to make your day an orderly one, to feel that you are using your
time well, to strive for a higher living standard, to escape from
everyday reality, to overcome loneliness, and so on. This is the
domain of self-concern. For the primary group area, we asked about
the importance, cognitively and emotionally, of spending time with
family and friends. With respect to state and people, we asked how
important is it to you to understand what's going on in the world?
How important is it to you to understand the true character of our
political leaders? How important is it to you to believe in our leaders,
feel pride in our state, and so on.
Many of the changes are small but consistent and significant; a
few are very sharp. Table I displays these changes over time. Overall,
there is an increase in concern for self and a decreased concern for
society and state. There is more egoism than there was 20 years ago.
Although concern for the future is still predominant, concern for the
present has risen sharply. Pleasure is more highly valued, and there is
an increase in the valuation of leisure as compared with work. Indeed,
the importance of leisure is now more or less equivalent to the
importance of work, whereas in 1970 work was more important than
leisure, future was far more important than present. In sum, there is a.

rise in what might be called hedonism and individualism, and in the
legitimacy of concern with self. These are big words for small
changes, but they are very clear in the data
Their counterpart-the decline in collectivity-oriented values-may
be observed in the lesser importance attributed to feelings of
belonging to the larger society in matters such as the values of
"having confidence in our leaders," "feeling that I am participating in
current affairs," and "having pride in our state," although the latter is
still at the top of the list. Organizational and political membership has
experienced a decline. While the family retains its high place at both
time periods, and is highly correlated with orientation to the
collectivity, the value of spending time with friends has taken a major
leap, and we know, from our study, that friends pull towards pleasure
and pluralism and away from the burdens of the collectivity (Katz,
Trope, and Haas, 1984). There is also a large increase in concern with
"overcoming loneliness when I am alone at home."
Just as we asked in the case of changing cultural practices, we

asked again in the case of changing values: does television have any
share in these changes? Is television to "blame" in any way for the
slow invasion of individualism and hedonism? It seems a fair guess
that the answer is no. No one can deny that in its twenty years of
existence as the sole national channel, Israel TV has demonstrated an
incredible ability to seat the society together every night, to celebrate
national achievements and religious occasions, indeed, to symbolize
"togetherness."
In fact, if television has had any influence on values, we
propose that it may have slowed these new trends. Rather than
promoting individualism, pluralism or hedonism, it is more likely to
have held them back, while reinforcing the sense of belonging to the
civic sphere and the nostalgia for collectivity that permeates
movements of national liberation such as Zionism. It is true that the
opponents of television forecast a rise in self-oriented concerns and a
decline in collectivistic ones: that the personal will supplant the
collective, that egoism will displace altruism, that pleasure will uproot
dedication. The only trouble with the prediction is that it does not at
all correspond to the message of the first twenty years of Israel
television, or to the shared experience it offered.

Function of Television and the Other Media

To this point, we have acted as observers comparing changes in
culture and values with what we know about the institutionalization of
Israel TV, its organizational form, content and function. We wish to
turn now to ask the viewers what they think are the functions of
television and the other media. Do they see things as the researchers
do?
To do so, we asked respondents to assess the helpfulness of
each of five media-radio, television, book, newspaper, cinema-for
satisfying each of the "values" outlined in the previous section (and in
Table 1). For example, following the value question, "How important
is it for you to understand what's going on in the world?" we asked
further, "How useful are newspapers for this purpose? How useful are
books for this purpose?" and so on for the five media. We are really
asking which media best satisfy each of the respondents' needs or
values.6
In 1970, the newspaper was the predominant medium. Of the
35 concerns or values about which we inquired, the newspaper
fulfilled more different functions than the other four. In 1990,
television had displaced the newspaper very clearly as the medium
which best fulfills more different kinds of concerns.7

That television has displaced the newspaper as the most
diversified medium is not so surprising. The important point is that it
ranks ahead of the other media in the area of the collectivity,
especially in the emotional aspect of attachment to nation and people.
More surprising, perhaps, is that television is rated the medium most
helpful in satisfying national values that are not only affective but
cognitive, i.e. not only "to feel pride in our state" but "to understand
the true character of our leaders".

.

After its widespread diffusion in the early '70s, television also became
important in satisfying many other functions as well, such as
overcoming loneliness and spending time with family. But in the
minds of most Israelis, television takes only second place to books or
cinema or both with respect to personal values such as knowing
oneself, cultivating good taste, being entertained, aesthetic experience,
spending time with friends, improving morale. In short, Israelis
appear to be saying that television has outdistanced the other
media-especially newspapers- in cognitive and affective aspects of
relating to the collectivity even more than to the self or to
interpersonal relations
The book, for its part, has retained all of its functions and even
increased slightly in the number of important concerns it is thought to
serve. Although the frequency of reading (not the overall percentage
of readers) has declined somewhat, the book is holding its own from a
functional point of view. Substantively, we can say that the book best
fulfills functions related to self, especially affective ones. It is
supreme among the five media in these functions. In Victor Nell's
terms, "it is the affective part of self which the book best serves."
Along with books, cinema continues to share the self-oriented
and affective realm, that is, the emotional aspects of self-fulfillment.
Cinema has become altogether different from television, functionally

speaking, over the period of 20 years. If in 1970 cinema was
considered the universal medium of entertainment, by 1990 it has
become an art and behaves like the other arts, in the sense of being
correlated with education: the higher the education the higher the
consumption of cinema, and of theater, concerts, museums and
galleries. This was not true for cinema prior to the inception of
television.
The cinema and television do not fulfill each other's functions
any more. What we now have is a cinema that is allied with books on
the one hand, and television which is allied with radio. This may be
truer in Israel than elsewhere, since news and public affairs dominate
the broadcasting media, and the populace is highly politicized. It also
explains the displacement by television of the functions of the
newspaper. In 1970, people apparently thought that TV would join
film as a medium of fiction and pleasure, but this expectation has not
so far been fulfilled. Instead, TV joined newspapers and radio as a
medium of current affairs. Yet the picture may reverse again as
television channels multiply, and TV may yet rejoin cinema as a
medium of pleasure.
In a word, after 20 years of Israel television, Israelis see it as it
saw itself, namely, as a medium of the collectivity. More important
than self-gratification, Israelis experienced their one-channel

television as a way to connect with the larger society and its civic
concerns. Escapism and entertainment are thought to have been better
served by other media.

Conclusion

In comparing Israel of 1970 with Israel of 1990-prior to the
diversification of channels now replacing the 20-year old
monopoly-we have documented three areas of change: (1) The
content of values has moved, however slowly, in an individualistic
direction, in the direction of pleasure at the expense of civic
obligation. (2) There is a decline in participation in the perforrnative
arts, and in events that transpire at fixed times and places, with large
numbers of participants. By contrast, there is a rise in activities that
involve small groups of people doing their own things, at times and
places of their own choosing. (3) The perceived division of labor
among the media suggests that Israeli Jews identify their public
television (prior to the new competition) as having served collective
functions rather better (although not more frequently) than
individualistic or hedonistic functions.
Simply stated, the data suggest that Israeli society-its values,
its cultural practices-is moving slowly away from the collectivism that

characterized it (and still does, relative to other societies) and towards
greater self-indulgence. But Israel television cultivates collectivismas its viewers and observers both think. If so, and if television can
affect basic values at all, we must infer that the process of value
change has been slowed by television. As critical school theorists used
to say, non-change or slowed change may be the major effect of the
media of mass communication (Katz, 1980).
Nor can television be held directly responsible for the decline
in the patterns of collective consumption of culture and the arts. The
most compelling argument we can find to connect the two is that
individualistic and interactive patterns of "going out" are, ironically, a
reaction against the collectivism of staying home with television.8 In
the simplest sense, if Israel television has successfully transformed
the home into a theater or forum, then people want to do something
else when they go out. In a larger sense, however, it suggests a
saturation not only with the togetherness of Israel television but with
togetherness and sacrifice made by the state and society during the
first four decades of its embattled history. As in the case of values,
Israel television is pulling against the stress of change, rather than
with it.
Yet there is a nagging sense in which this may not be true. The
message of television may be collectivistic, and its symbolic function

likewise, as rightly perceived by its viewers. But there is also the
reality of the medium as technology, and the way in which it situates
its audience. While it may not keep them from going out, the fact is
that its offerings can only be consumed at home. People may talk
about the programs the next morning (30% do), but is this the
equivalent of going out to a meeting of one's trade union, or political
party, or going out to the theater? Whether television has made
home-and-family into a locus of political action and cultural
experience is still an open question. It is equally possible that it has
done no more than give people the illusion of being "engaged," in line
with what Lazarsfeld and Merton (1948) call the "narcotizing
dysfunction" of broadcast news, or what Gerbner et al. (1979) think of
as pulling people out of society and into the isolation of their living
rooms.
And one wonders, similarly, whether television as a medium
has not had a major share in the personalization of politics that is now
sweeping the country. Primary elections have displaced the power of
the party chiefs in selecting candidates for the parliament, and a
populist law has been passed calling for the direct election of the
prime minister, to the consternation of most social scientists. There is
good reason to believe that television has weakened the party system
by moving it indoors and, willy nilly, making it intimate.

Thus, early opposition to the introduction of television in
Israel may have (1) been right, but for the wrong reasons, and (2)
been right, but prematurely. Being right for the wrong reasons, the
opponents suspected that television harbored a subversive message,
not so much realizing that it was the medium itself rather than the
message that may be problematic. Being right but prematurely, they
could not have anticipated that the function of national integration
would be so well served by Israel Television during its first two
decades. But they may be right from now on. In the era of commercial,
multi-channel narrowcasting, Israel may now have to make way for
the escapist self-indulgence prematurely anticipated by the early
opponents and latter-day critics like Houston and Postman.
Perhaps even more important than the message or the medium,
the influence of television may be related to the form of its
institutionalization in a particular society. The manifest and latent
effects of a monopoly channel, operated by an independent Authority,
in a newly democratic society, with a strong collective will, may be
altogether different from the competitive, mixed commercial/public,
multi-channel system now beginning to broadcast to a much more
individualistic society of Israelis.
To summarize: (1) In spite of a persistent collectivism, we
perceive a slow but sure trend towards self-gratification among

Israelis at the expense of some decline in the pioneering values that
characterized the society twenty and more years ago. (2) We perceive
a decline in collective forms of out-of-home leisure in favor of more
differentiated and pleasure-oriented pursuits typically enjoyed with
small groups of friends. (3) Since its establishment 20 years ago, over
one-third of leisure time in Israel is spent viewing television and some
(but by no means all) of the functions of other media have been
subsumed by television. (4) The safest thing to say about the long-run
effects of television on the changes in Israel culture and society is that
it is an impossible question to answer. (5) If one has to choose-on the
basis of these comparative data-whether Israel television gave more
support to the individualizing trend or to the norm of collectivism,
there is a much stronger case to be made for the latter. The
collectivism we have in mind has to do with shared and simultaneous
pursuits, governed by norms of self-sacrifice and mutual obligation,
performed in the knowledge that everybody else is similarly occupied;
the Jewish Sabbath would be a classic example. (6) If Israel television
did indeed serve as a bulwark against individualistic and hedonistic
trends, it did so because of its message (offering a shared agenda to
the society), because of the technology of electronic simultaneity and
because of its independent-but-monopolistic form of organization. (7)
At a deeper level, however, some of the latent aspects of the message

(patriotism, perpetual tension, etc.) and of the medium (the atomistic
way in which it situates viewers, its mode of personalization of issues)
may also have pulled in the other direction. (8) There is good reason
to expect that the new multi-channel television with its emphasis on
choice and consumerism will give much stronger support to
individuating trends it situates viewers, its mode of personalization of
issues) may also have pulled in the other direction. (8) There is good
reason to expect that the new multi-channel television with its
emphasis on choice and consumerism will give much stronger support
to individuating trends.
To repeat, the closest parallel to the argument of this paper
about the first 20 years of television in Israel is Cardiff and Scannell's
(1987) analysis of the national integration which was fostered during
the early days of BBC radio and then BBC television.*

Notes

1. While the 1990 study included both Jews and Arabs, the 1970 study
interviewed only Israeli Jews and therefore this comparison is limited to the
Jewish population.
2. To repeat, Israeli Arabs are not included in this comparative study because
the 1970 study did not encompass the Arab sector. It is noteworthy, however.

That Israel Television is the primary and most reliable television news
source mentioned by Israeli Arabs in 1990. We make no attempt here,
however, to analyze the functions of television for the Arab sector.
3. These data are from "time budget" analysis where the interviewee is aided in
reconstructing how he/she spent the past 24 hours. Averaging an activity
such as TV viewing in this way includes the 0 hours of those who did not
view at all "yesterday." Hence the discrepancy between the 2-3 hours of the
modal viewer and the slightly lower figures (1.7 on weekdays, 2.3 on
Fridays, 2.0 on Saturdays) noted here. Each fraction of an hour equals 6
minutes; thus 1.7 equals 102 minutes.
4 TV viewing averaged one hour in 1970 when many people were still
without sets of their own, and the number of broadcast hours was small.
5. We have roughly comparable data from several European countries and the
U.S. However, no systematic analysis has yet been undertaken across
cultures.
6. Questions about the utility of the media were asked only with respect to
those values considered at least "somewhat important" by the respondent,
and with respect to those media to which the respondent was exposed at
least to some extent. Thus, a respondent who attributed "no importance at
all" to the need "to experience beauty” was not asked which media helped
gratify this need. If he/she never goes out to see a film, questions about the
helpfulness of cinema were not asked.

7. The discussion that follows is based on changes in the roles of the five
media with respect to each of the 35 different needs or values. Table 2
groups these needs into 9 categories, and averages them.
8. That does not mean that the higher standard of living and self·-indulgence is
not to be found in Israeli homes. Our argument, rather, is that the home is
home to television, and that television is experienced as "we."
*Some of Meyrowitz (1985) also has bearing.
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